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Rediscovering Religion  
and Secularism
A Critique of a Critique1
In this paper, I will discuss the academic critique of secularism 
that is emanating from Western academic discourse and some 
of its limitations. I will also discuss how this scholarly critique 
of secularism has been used in Palestine, among other places, 
to defend symbolic as well as real repressive social norms 
within Muslim societies, and to defend the call for creating 
an Islamist state. This discussion is to be taken in the context 
of the Arab Spring, where political Islamist movements that 
embody fantasies about a certain past are calling for a return 
to a “real,” “non-secular,” “Islamic” state. Both such academic 
and political arguments base their analyses and arguments 
on false assumptions—epistemological as well as historical. 
My paper will attempt to discuss these assumptions and 
propose a possible political future that does not dichotomize 
secularism, religion, and politics, while drawing evidence from 
within Islamic knowledge on the rational rather than religious 
approach to organizing societies and states. 
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INTRODUCTION
My paper is to be taken in the context of the events and changes that 
have taken place in West Asia and North Africa since 2011, and of 
the rise of Islamist political parties to power (including the seizure of 
governments) as they make their presence more strongly apparent in 
the public space. This paper is also written in the context of how the 
“discourse of tolerance” has become focused on the religious, i.e., on 
listening or giving space to Islamist parties/groups and Islamic religion, 
and other religions as well. This is not a totally new phenomenon, 
as I will show in the following discussion, but one that has gained 
strength in academia for years in the United States and elsewhere. 
(For examples of this phenomenon, see Asad 2003, 2009; Connolly 
1999; Mahmood 2005, 2006, 2012; Taylor 2007; among others.) The 
demand is presented as that of “openness,” and also of “making space” 
for those supposedly marginalized in academia. Of course, such an 
argument ignores the power held by Islamist groups in making their 
voices heard not only through academia, but also through a variety 
of means, ranging from television and radio stations, internet sites, 
newspapers and magazines, and political representation. Hence, the 
call for opening space for religion and religious views comes only to 
reinforce existing hegemonic forces: fundamentalist Christian Zionists 
in the United States and fundamentalist Islamists in the Arab world.2 
The call in Western academia for openness, tolerance, and dialogue, 
can also be seen as part of what I call an “interfaith industry,” which 
rather than being about equality is about keeping hegemonic forces 
intact. In this context, the inclusion of so-called religious minorities is 
only an act of tokenism, which keeps the real minority groups on the 
margin and further silences them by an apparent inclusion that does 
not transform the reality on the ground, where members of minority 
groups remain under repression and surveillance at home and abroad 
(Shihade 2011). This trend of giving voice to Islamic groups/parties 
is also in essence apolitical, for it focuses on “piety” and not on the 
militancy that is part and parcel of political religious groups/parties (as 
there is hardly any such group that is completely devoid of politics). 
And finally, this trend of giving voice to religious groups/parties has 
become so mainstream, while non-religious political groups/parties in 
West Asia are North Africa are either maligned or totally ignored in 
academia—especially so if such a group espouses militancy, militancy 
that comes only naturally in the face of extremely violent colonial 
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and imperial interventions in the region. So, in other words, what 
is being “tolerated” or made space for remains within the confines 
of mainstream liberal sensibilities. This trend, I argue, has become 
global due to the hegemony of the United States, including within 
the area of knowledge production within academia. To illustrate this 
global hegemony, I will provide a brief example from an educational 
institution in Palestine. 
In a series of talks surrounding the question of secularism and 
religion (a binary itself ), a university center has called for the refusal 
of the apparent dichotomy between choosing the official narrative of 
“liberal secular Palestinian Authority in the West Bank” (PA) and a 
religious authority in Gaza. Such a framing, which posits the PA as 
representative of secularism and Hamas in Gaza as representative of 
religion, is misleading. Rather than seeing them as the opposites of 
one another, one should see them as a continuum. Hamas uses religion 
primarily to gain public support, but also to control public space and 
vice versa; and the PA, dominated by Fatah, uses religion as well to 
challenge Hamas’s hegemony over this issue (religion), competing 
on for who is the better Muslim and thus reinforcing the dominant 
religion and a specific, more conservative religious discourse within 
it rather than proposing an alternative. The public space in the West 
Bank (under PA rule) is largely conservative in most towns, cities, and 
villages, and only in a few places, like Ramallah, are there enclaves of 
liberal spaces.
The shrinking of secular space in Palestine—a silencing of secular 
voices—is by no means unique to this context, as my discussion of 
anti-secular Western academic discourse will demonstrate. In the 
meantime, the threat posed to academic freedom and social liberties 
by Islamist politics remains unaccounted for by many intellectuals who 
openly defend a narrow notion of “tolerance,” one which primarily 
benefits conservative and Islamist forces. Both in Western academic 
institutions and elsewhere, the space for the critique of secularism is 
much larger than the space for secular discourse, especially so when it 
comes to discussing these topics in the context of West Asia and North 
Africa (among other places). Those who are critical of Islamist politics 
are either attacked as stooges of imperialism, or in some occasions, 
their lectures/talks are cancelled due to pressure from conservative 
forces, including those from outside academia. Both in the region, as 
well as in the West, there is little space for secular discourse when it 
comes to West Asia and North Africa. The MENA region has become 
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in academic and popular discourse a mirror image of Orientalism: 
People in the region cannot be understood outside the frame of 
religion, and sacred texts explain people’s attachments and practices. 
So, rather than being anti-imperialist/anti-Western, this discourse 
that is critical of secularism plays into Orientalism and fits well in its 
agenda of representation and in the political implications related to 
that framework as articulated by Edward Said (1979). 
Islamist forces have been present in the region for decades, especially 
so since the 1980s. Recently, we have seen the rise of political Islam to 
power in the last one to two years after the overthrow of regimes in the 
region during the Arab Spring, regimes that were once characterized 
as “secular” (I must add falsely so). Now, calls for the implementation 
of Shari’ and the establishment of Islamist states have been made in 
many countries in the region, including in the Palestinian territories. 
The arguments to support such calls are many—including the claim 
that a real Islamic society must be run according to the Shar’ia and 
its interpretation; that secularism has already missed its opportunity 
in the Arab world, failing to bring solutions to the political, social, 
and economic problems in the region; and that Western countries are 
not really secular. Therefore, we are told, why not let political Islam 
have its own course and find solutions to these problems? Of course 
these arguments ignore that many Arab countries are already Islamist 
(such as Saudi Arabia, among others), so Islamist states have also run 
their course as well. Furthermore, even those who are not considered 
Islamist (such as Egypt, Syria, or Iraq) are/were not completely 
“secular.” In some cases, they even encouraged political Islamist parties 
at the cost of liberal and Left parties. They have also more often than 
not deployed Islamist rhetoric and practices 
The claims that the secular Left in the region has failed might be 
true, but they require a context. Of course some of the mistakes are 
internal, but to ignore the regional and global onslaught on the secular 
Left does not allow for meaningful understanding of what has been 
taking place in the region. Furthermore, the claims that Islamist political 
groups are resisting imperialism and neoliberalism are misleading. 
As Samir Amin (2012) has argued, Islamist parties are in harmony 
with Western hegemony and its neoliberal politics and interventions. 
Furthermore, it is well documented that Western countries and their 
allies have targeted secular forces, while promoting religious/Islamist 
groups to counter socialist/leftist politics in the region  (Dreyfuss 2005, 
Mamdani 2004, among others). Also important: Whether in Palestine 
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or elsewhere, Islamist political groups have initiated neither resistance 
nor revolutions, but rather rode on these waves of protest and gained 
electoral vote due in part to the decimation, neutralization, and/or 
paralysis of the Left that, in turn, was due to decades of onslaught by 
imperial and colonial interventions with the cooperation of reactionary 
regional regimes.
So the rising voices in Palestine, after the coming to power of 
Islamist political parties in Tunisia and Egypt since 2011, did not 
come out of nowhere. It came after decades of crushing the secular 
Left, and after decades of intellectual production that in one way 
or another targeted secularism as the making of the West, and gave 
room to religious discourse. Such political use of religion has often 
relied on academic discourses that are critical of secularism; Islamist 
ideologues and scholars in the region derive their legitimacy from the 
anti-secularist stand promoted by some academics in the West, who 
seem oblivious or willfully inattentive to the impact their theories 
have on people, especially on progressive and non-normative people 
in Muslim-majority societies. Thus, it is worth reflecting on some of 
the arguments made in these academic discourses that are critical of 
secularism, before going further to discussing their limitations.
THE CRITIQUE OF SECULARISM
Among other aspects of his critique of the discourse of secularism, Talal 
Asad (2003, 2009), among others, correctly pointed out the misuse 
and abuse of the term. The invocation of secularism (like many others 
invocations such as democracy, human rights, etc.) is often politically 
motivated in the West, and Asad shows that discourse has been often 
used to justify Western intervention in the Muslim world. Yet important 
critiques like Asad’s have been used to defend oftentimes symbolic 
and sometimes real repressive social norms within Muslim societies. 
As a result, any critique of any practices in Muslim societies has 
been characterized as “Orientalist,” “colonialist,” and/or “imperialist.” 
Such defensive arguments against the critique of reactionary and 
backward social norms have relied also on scholarly work that calls 
for “cultural sensitivity,” the rejection of “universalism,” and other 
similar arguments that often play into the Orientalist discourse about 
the Arab and Muslim world, and allow local functionaries more space 
to defend repressive measures that are imposed on the public using 
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excuses based on the rhetoric of “Islamic or Arab authenticity.” In the 
context of recent developments in the Arab world, political Islamic 
movements use these arguments concerning Orientalist discourse to 
project fantasies about a certain past, calling for a return to a “real,” 
“non-secular,” “Islamic state.” 
Both such academic and political groups base their analyses and 
arguments in part on false assumptions, and buy into the Western 
denial of knowledge produced by non-Western scholarship over the 
long history of humanity, including issues of the separation between 
religion and politics—this issue is what my paper will attempt to 
discuss. My paper will also propose a possible political future that does 
not see binaries between secularism, religion, and politics—even from 
within Islamic history. In the following sections, I shall discuss some 
of these assumptions and arguments with the aim of clarifying some of 
their limitations and false assumptions, examining concrete conditions 
on the ground, and criticizing the ignorance of a long history in the 
Arab and Muslim world that challenges the arguments about the 
origins of the secular approach to social, economic, political, and other 
aspects of our lives.
BLIND SPOTS
Among the arguments made by scholars critical of secularism is the 
argument that academia in the United States has been hostile to 
religion, and has been ignorant and negligent of the force and depth 
of religious attachment among many members of the society (see, 
for example, Connolly 1999). Such an argument, as stated in the 
introduction, neglects several facts. One, to claim that academia has 
been “secular” is to ignore that several colleges are religious by their own 
definition of values, principles, and mission. Even public universities 
are full of different religious groups and centers that serve different 
religious communities. And there are also many academics who are 
religious and open to accommodating religion in their programs. In 
some cases, there are academics who are hostile to others who are not 
religious or critical of religion, especially politicized religions. In some 
cases, to be non-religious or out of the in-crowd that is sympathetic 
to religion impacts one’s prospects for academic jobs. So, in short, 
painting a picture of uniformly secular, anti-religious campuses is 
misleading and inaccurate.  
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Furthermore, as stated in the introduction, to argue for tolerance 
and religious diversity can also lead to making the dominant religion, 
specifically the religious orthodoxy within that religion, more 
hegemonic, rather than allowing for equal standing of all beliefs 
(religious and otherwise). To be “open and tolerant” to religion in the 
United States can only lead to making the dominant and active Zionist 
Christians or born-again Christians have more dominant presence 
on campuses. This dynamic of centering the dominant religions in 
the United States (Christianity and Judaism, as the nation is seen as 
part of the so called Judeo-Christian civilization), still feeds into the 
assertion of religion of other religious groups, making them visible, 
allowing them to claim public space. The ultimate result is that one 
can be critical of anything on campuses except religion. Something 
similar takes place in Palestine and elsewhere in West Asia and 
North Africa. To be “open and tolerant” to religion in a dominantly 
Muslim society such as in Palestine, can only lead to further making 
the Islamist religious groups more dominant in our campuses. In a 
sense, tolerance in such contexts can mean the exclusion of minorities 
(religious, gendered, sexual, political, etc.) and the dominance of the 
majorities. 
It is thus important to differentiate between the minority’s 
critique of discrimination and intolerance (see Said 1997, 2004; Mufti 
1998, 2004; among others) and the majority’s perception of being 
discriminated against. Such perceptions are used by Christian Zionists 
in the United States, Hindu rightwing groups in India, and Islamist 
political groups in the Arab and Muslim worlds to reinforce their 
hegemony. 
But a minority’s critique, as well as the critique of discrimination 
against a minority, should not be taken at face value, despite its 
importance. It is crucial not to overlook repressive social, economic, 
or legal aspects of religious practices by these same minorities against 
those who are not seen as equal according to the doctrines of such 
religions (e.g., women, among others). Furthermore, one should not 
conflate fighting against discrimination in the West and specifically 
racism against Muslims with sympathy for Islamist groups in the Arab 
and Muslim world, who are already part of the dominant culture in 
that context. In the context of the Arab and Muslim world, Islamist 
groups already rely on a Muslim hegemonic structure (which includes, 
for example, that heads of states ought to be Muslims) in the political 
system. They aim at using religion to compete with existing elites using 
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the language of “true Islam” to take over power/governments and, in 
the process, dominate the public space further. While in the West the 
issue of defending Islam is packaged in the slogan of toleration, in 
the Arab and Muslim worlds, it is an issue of imposition and further 
hegemony over the public space and the political system. So scholars 
in Asia and Africa must not borrow the critique of secularism as if they 
were speaking about a minority being discriminated against, when, 
in fact, the issue in these continents is, in most cases, about a religion 
of a majority that dominates social, economic, and political aspects 
of daily life of the people who live there. It would be more fitting if 
scholars interested in this kind of critique made critical studies of the 
hegemonic religious aspects of the states and societies in these regions, 
rather than blindly following the critique of intolerance against Islam 
in the Western environment.
Another important aspect of the critique of secularism is that 
it takes lightly the argument that secularism in Europe/West aims 
at the separation between state and church, at making the church/
religion less powerful in leading or controlling society and the state. 
The limitation of such an analysis lies in neglecting the context within 
Europe/West. While it might be true to argue that such a definition 
of the term—secularism—is superficial and limited since religion 
remains part of Western societies and states in modern times, it is 
also a superficial and limited approach to neglect the importance of 
such a definition and its historical development in a continent that 
was plagued by religious wars and the dominance of the church and 
religion—with huge implications on individuals’ rights (including 
property rights, and the rights of death and life), as controlling states 
and societies based on religious texts and revelations left so much 
damage in these societies. Of course in the past the Pope would take 
lands from people with the promise that these people would have lands 
in the next life, while in the “secular age,” states take lands from people 
with the promise of public good. The former relies on a completely 
arbitrary framework; the latter is, at least in theory, under the scrutiny 
of the public. The right to property and the right to life, central poles 
of Western capitalist modernity (of course, for rich whites), are at least 
quantitatively, if not also qualitatively, different when one compares the 
age of the dominance of the church against the age of the dominance 
of the state.
It is true that many of these Western states are not truly or 
completely secular (the weight of the church of England for example). 
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But there is a qualitative difference between the past, where such states 
were subject to the powerful dominance of the church, and the present, 
where the church plays a less powerful role and where members of 
society are more involved in decision-making about issues of war 
and peace and property rights, and where people’s lives and deaths 
are not decided by a cleric, but by laws and regulations that are more 
transparent. Of course, the democratic shifts in these societies can be 
critiqued for its limitations, imperfections, problems, hypocrisy, and 
racism against immigrants and marginalized groups, among other 
issues. But to target secularism as the main problem in these societies 
is to neglect larger economic, social, and political questions, and also 
to neglect how race/racism remains central to these states’ foreign 
policies and interventions.
Furthermore, while it is important to critique the use of terms such 
as secularism as a tool for foreign intervention, to limit the critique of 
the role of such discourse to external interventions is insufficient in 
understanding the complexity and role of such discourses. A more astute 
insight developed by Laura Nader can be more helpful. According to 
Nader (1989, 323), such a discourse, in the case of women’s rights in 
the Third World, deployed in the West from the position of superiority, 
leads to two things: one external, that is intervention, and the other one 
internal, that such discourse suppresses the unequal reality of women 
in Western societies and limits the possibilities for more advances of 
women rights within the West itself.
The critique by Asad (2009), and others along the same line, of 
secularism as a dialectical tool of Western imperialism should not be 
used to defend repressive and reactionary and dictatorial practices 
in the Arab and Muslim world, and should not be used to defend 
some Islamist political movements—even though some of these 
movements were either the creation of colonial policies or were 
adopted by Muslims as a copycat of Western religious movements 
and practices, none of which is really organic, pure, or authentically 
Islamic in essence (Mahmood 2006). For example, to defend the hijab 
by presenting it as a tool that embodies agency neglects the religious 
and social pressures placed on many Muslim women, who continue 
to be held as a symbol of the purity of the society and as a symbol of 
evil for patriarchal misogynist societies. And, by the way, why would 
girls, at such the early age of 4 to 5, need a hijab? What agency is there 
at such an age? Or, for example, if some deploy a critique of honor 
killing within Arab and Muslim societies through different means 
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(scholarship, art, etc.), why should that be attacked as being a tool of 
colonialist, imperialist, and Orientalist forces? One could be critical 
of imperialist, colonialist, and Orientalist discourses and forces, while 
at the same time also being critical of internal pathological practices. 
There is no contradiction between being on the border and border 
thinking, as Al-Khatibi explains (discussed in Mignolo 2012, 66), On 
the contrary, to ignore the dialectic of modern life between the inside 
and the outside is intellectually, morally, and politically problematic. 
And if there was a failure of secularism (of course ignoring the 
lack of secularism as such in the Arab world and the West alike, and 
ignoring that many of the so-called secular regimes in the Arab and 
Islamic world were targeted by Western imperialism), the answer 
must not be more piety or religiosity.3 In short, why must the critique 
of secularism come through studies of piety? Does this mean that 
religious practices are the only expression of resistance against Western 
hegemony and intervention? Does this not reflect the reality that global 
imperialist dynamics created space only for religious political groups? 
Is that why even radicals from the Left support political religious 
(Islamist) groups because they are seen as the only forces that oppose 
Western hegemony? Are these radicals aware of the fact that Western 
imperialist hegemony has created such forces? And are these radicals 
attentive to the social, cultural, and economic aspects of such Islamist 
groups? Of course, some of the groups that one can call Islamist have 
been resisting imperialism, but they are not the only ones. And those 
who actually practice such resistance are the minority, and the majority 
are implicated in imperialists policies as we see now in the context of 
events in Syria.  
Furthermore, in these studies, it is often neglected how many of 
these movements have not only been shaped by Western modernity, 
and/or are a product of it, but also how these groups often come to 
embody and repeat Orientalist representations of Arabs and Muslims 
as being essentialized categories that are frozen in time and space. It 
is in this context of reactionary practices and self-Orientalizing, and/
or self-fulfilling of Orientalist discourse, that one can understand 
the reactionary attacks by crowds in Arab and Muslims countries 
whenever there is a cartoon, a book, or a film negatively depicting 
Islam. Such reactions and practices ought not be defended or justified 
in any form. For those who participate in and or defend such reactions, 
the question is: Why are there no such reactions when Muslims’ lives 
are slaughtered in the Arab and Muslim worlds? Why is it that a text 
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or an image is more important than human lives? Why would people 
in Muslim countries go out in large numbers to protest desecration of 
a religious text or a symbol, but not so when humans are abused and/
or killed? Why is it that texts and symbols are more important than 
human lives and dignity? And finally, why accuse those who are critical 
of such local practices of stooges of Western imperialism (see below)?
Rather than accusing those who are critical of both Western 
colonialism and Islamic fundamentalism of being stooges of US 
imperialism,4 one is better reminded of the role that the West played 
in propping up Islamic movements in Egypt, Pakistan, Syria, and/or 
Palestine to suppress nationalist and leftist currents in the region, and in 
shaping Islamists’ ideology and practices (Dreyfuss 2005, Spivak 2004, 
Mamdani 2004). Today, while many Western leaders and “experts” 
participate in dehumanizing Islam, and use this demonization as a tool 
to intervene, they are also creating a certain kind of Islam, as they did 
with the Islamic movements they helped empower during the Cold 
War to undermine Arab and Third World nationalism. As with Egypt, 
for example: The main focus of Western powers is to keep Egypt loyal 
to the “peace” treaty with Israel, and not allow “extremists” to threaten 
the “security” of the Israeli colonial state. So is the case with Western 
concerns and interventions in the rest of the region, which mainly 
focus on keeping the dependency of the region and the hegemony and 
superiority of Israel, which fits well with supporting political Islam, as 
Amin (2012) argues.
And it is worth reminding ourselves and others that Third World 
nationalism was never secular (in the French sense of being hostile to 
the church or to religion)—not in Syria, in Iraq, or in Egypt. Rather, 
it respected religion and at times even used it as a unifying factor—yet 
it also was not ready to be run over by imperialist stooges who wanted 
to use Islam to take over governments while recreating a fantasy of 
and about the past of an “authentic Islamic state” that never existed, 
and who never challenged the core capitalist and neoliberal economic 
principles of the West. These movements are using Islam as a tool for 
hegemony and the control of our societies, not as a tool for economic, 
political, military, and epistemic liberation.
Furthermore, rather than critiquing Said’s theorizing about 
secular critique and secular humanism as elitist, one should not forget 
that these same critics are part of the elite that both enjoys privileges 
in the West and are also sheltered, by virtue of their elite position, 
from the repressive practices of different Islamic movements in the 
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Arab and Muslim worlds, whose immediate victims are the lower/
poorer classes that cannot escape the public space dominated by these 
conservative forces. Rather than attacking Said’s secular humanism, it 
is important to give credit to his contribution to the study of Islam. 
His critique of Western representations of Islam—which was a 
pioneering work, especially in Orientalism and Covering Islam—needs 
to be acknowledged over and over again as a reminder to those who 
think that their discourse is new in defending against Islamophobia in 
the West.
Another important issue that remains silenced in the critique of 
secularism and the critique of racism against Muslims in Western 
countries, is the almost complete absence of politics in such writings, 
especially when it comes to the question of Palestine. It does not 
seem to be a coincidence that this issue has been absent, since the 
campaign against Muslims in the West is closely related to that 
question (Carr 2006). None of the writings around this issue, while 
critiquing Western discourse and practices about Islam, seem to 
engage the question of Palestine, which is central to analyzing the 
issue. That is, the vilification of Muslims and Islam is promoted 
through a campaign of fear mongering by Zionists, directed at Arabs 
and Muslims in Europe and the West in general (ibid.). For example, 
in much of the writing by scholars on the Danish cartoons, there was 
hardly any linkage made between the Danish cartoonist and Daniel 
Pipes and other pro-Israeli Zionists—who are part of a campaign in 
the West to frame the Palestine issue as that of Islam versus the rest 
or as a religious issue (Al Jazeera 2012a, 2012b), rather than an issue 
of colonialism and racism. I am not saying that any critique of the 
West and racism against Muslims should center on the question of 
Palestine. But when anti-Palestinian Zionist ideologues like Daniel 
Pipes in the United States and his likes in Europe are active actors 
in these campaigns, it seems strange, to say the least, to keep the 
question of Palestine and Zionism outside the parameter of critique. 
In other words, what explains the absence of the Palestine issue in 
critiquing the different manifestations of racism against Muslims in 
the West (such as the cartoons), when the Palestine question is so 
present among these same racist actors? Is it because such scholarship 
is mainly concerned with abstract intellectual debates and does not 
wish to be involved in daily politics (which does not seem to be the 
case)? Or is it because this discourse is limited by the liberal interfaith 
industry that is only interested in promoting religion (again in the 
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abstract) while neglecting the crucial connections of the use and 
misuse of religion in politics?
Said’s contribution in the area of secular humanism, as well as 
those who are taking Said’s work seriously and who aim at reviving 
Said’s critical secularism, should not be attacked, maligned, or even 
denounced/labeled as agents of US imperialism, as promoting US 
imperialism, or designated as elitist5 for their work on humanist 
criticism, which is not against religion but against repression, silencing, 
and exclusion of all peoples regardless of their location, ethnicity, 
religion, or gender (Said 1983, 2004). Works such as that of Amir 
Mufti (1998, 2004)—who advances Said’s idea about the concept 
of secular criticism as that belonging to minority criticism— which 
aim at challenging any form of hegemony, exclusion, and repression, 
are more interesting and anti-colonial at their core, for they not only 
challenge the Euro-centric approach to the concept and practices of 
secularism, but also aim at creating a new framework for societies to 
live/co-exist without any form of repression and exclusion.
Those who feel attacked by Western discourse and intervention 
in the region are justified to fight back, as many of us do, but not in 
a defensive way that blinds one to reality, or covers up our internal 
problems. Neither should one contribute to simplifying Islam from 
a diverse faith in theory and historical practice to a set of rules and 
regulations that aim at making Islam singular in theory and practice, 
leading to the conflation of Islamism and Islamization with Islam 
and the reduction of Islam to one thing, rather than diverse schools 
and practices, as Ronald Judy (2003) argues. Doing so one plays into 
Western Orientalist discourse, including Zionist discourse, about 
Islam and Muslims.
Such religious-political discourse in the name of Islam or in the 
defense of Islam is a colonial discourse, and the talk of establishing an 
Islamic state in Palestine, as with elsewhere in the region, is a copycat 
of the Israeli Jewish colonial racist state, rather than a challenge to 
the Jewish colonial state in Palestine that was the creation of Western 
imperialist power, which continues to enjoy their support. Furthermore, 
while Wael Hallaq’s (2012) argument about the incompatibility of 
Islam with the state is convincing—as the state that we know it today is 
a modern Western structure that has its own historical development—
it is also true that this is the case with any religious state. It is not 
only impossible to combine Islam as a religion with the modern state 
structure, but it is also so for any religious state, because religion 
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automatically excludes those who do not belong to the specific religion 
adopted by the dominant group in such a state. In the region (North 
Africa and West Asia, as with other regions in both continents), one 
is born into a specific religion because of parents who follow that 
religion. So one is included or excluded by birth, regardless if one is 
religious or not. While modern nation-states by nature include and 
exclude, the forms and intensities of inclusion and exclusion are more 
intensified for those living in religious states (Islamic or otherwise). 
In some cases in the region, this inclusion and exclusion not only 
exclude non-Muslims, but also Muslims who belong to another sect 
(Shi’a among others), or even those from the same sect yet who do not 
follow the same practice and ideology of the dominant Islamist party. 
In other cases, members of that specific religion can have more rights 
than individuals and groups who were born in that state, like the case 
of Israel that defines itself as a state for the Jewish people. In that state, 
Jews from anywhere can have automatic citizenship and more rights 
than Palestinians (Muslims and Christians alike) who were born in 
and citizens of the Israeli state. In some sense, some of these Islamist 
groups are following the Israeli model. 
Finally, in this regard, the critique of the state’s tyranny is useful 
and needed. Yet, it does not mean that we end up with both—top-
down state political and economic tyranny, and bottom-up religious 
and social tyranny. Following such a route, we will end up being 
squeezed between the tyrannies of both. This is not the solution, as it 
will make the situation worse, especially for those who are less likely 
to have the means to create their own space, or be mobile enough 
to escape the tyranny of the state and the public space controlled by 
Islamist groups. 
BETWEEN BINARIES, AND THE BUYING INTO 
“WESTERN KNOWLEDGE”
There is a history of denial in the West of the contribution of Arab 
and Muslim thought, despite the fact that this thought was central 
to the making of the West and Europe, to Western and European 
identity (Lyons 2009, Delanty 1995). While Western denial and 
misappropriation of knowledges produced in many parts of the non-
Western world are documented and central to the making of Western 
colonial racist hegemonic modernity,6 it is important for those who are 
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critical of this Western racist modernity not to fall into this modernity’s 
traps and binaries, and not to neglect Arab scholarship.7 For denying 
this scholarship was central to the making of Eurocentrism and 
Western hegemony. The arguments critical of secularism, which present 
secularism as a modern Christian Western discourse, such as those 
discussed earlier, replicated the Western denial of the contributions 
of other cultures to global knowledge, buying into the myth and the 
dichotomy of European/Western discourse on religion and secularism, 
as if such debates were purely the invention of the West and not part of 
the global development of thought and critique—including the Arab/
Muslim world, where there are many examples over the centuries of 
such debates. Here, I will limit myself to the work of Ibn Khaldun on 
the subject, which serve as a reminder of the history of such debates in 
the Arab and Muslim worlds, challenging the aforementioned binaries. 
In his discussion of the conditions enabling any community to 
survive and prosper, Ibn Khaldun (2005, xxi, 33, 40–42, 47–48, 81, 
107–9, 150, 156–57, 238–48, 258, 293, 308–9) argues that, religious 
texts and religious experts are not the source for the study of human 
history and its development, nor a source for decision-making on 
social, economic, or political questions. These issues are any society’s 
concern, and rather must be tackled by rational thought that, while not 
providing room for faith, must be tackled rationally through human 
critical faculties.
While he was a religious believer of Islam, Ibn Khaldun based 
his argument on religious, historical, and material facts, and argued 
that religion/faith is not the central issue for a community’s survival 
and prosperity. This is evidenced by how other cultures in the region, 
before the coming of Islam, managed to develop sophisticated social 
organizations (e.g., Egyptians, Mesopotamian, and other cultures), 
and by how, during his time, other groups belonging to other 
religions, including those who were in what we call today Asia, and 
whose numbers were much larger than Muslims, have managed to 
sustain continuous existence, surviving, prospering, and developing 
sophisticated cultures. Since these societies did not belong to the so-
called monotheistic religions (groups that lived in what we call today 
India and China, for example), then, his argument follows, religion 
and faith—in this case, Islam—is not the primary condition for these 
groups’ survival and prosperity.
Ibn Khaldun further argues, that even if one wishes to claim that 
religion/faith/Islam was the defining principle of how we ought to 
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study and run the affairs of our societies, humans, including scholars, 
cannot do that because all believers admit that only God is all-
knowing and possessing of that ability to know, and his words revealed 
to the prophets cannot be understood by common human faculties. 
If there are some who have some special abilities to communicate 
with God directly and know the meaning of his words, these are only 
the prophets, and there are no longer any living prophets to know/
interpret the Qur’an and God’s directives to run the state. In his view, 
while prophets and prophesy existed according to different religious 
traditions, it is a rare phenomenon, and the majority of people are not 
prophets according to the religious understanding of prophecy. Even 
those who believe in religion know that only prophets have direct 
communication with God, and since we are not prophets, we must 
look for our own rational human faculties to find solutions for our 
daily affairs, questions, and problems.
Ibn Khaldun argues further, that even those who assume they 
know what the Qur’an exactly says might be wrong, because there 
is a difference between a thought, and expressing that thought in 
speech or in writing. Also, there is the added difficulty linked to how a 
listener or a reader might perceive the real meaning of that thought or 
idea expressed in speech or in a text. In other words, texts, the Qur’an 
included, cannot be understood by reading them in the same way they 
were intended or expressed by God or delivered to the community by 
the prophet, and each person or believer will have difficulty in making 
his or her understanding a uniform one for others to follow. This is 
why there are many schools in each religion believing in the same text/
God.
As a result of the arguments presented above, Ibn Khaldun argues 
that, rather than relying on religious texts and religious experts, 
rational critical human mental faculties are needed to deal with social, 
economic, and political realities. Rationality is therefore necessary to 
analyze human social relations and societies, and central to the survival 
and prosperity of the community, any community.
 According to Ibn Khaldun, rather than piety or faith, there are 
several factors that are necessary for human societies to exist, survive, 
and prosper. First, and here is his starting point, humans by nature are 
political, meaning that they can only live in a poli-plural life. To survive 
and prosper, individuals need to exist in a community/collective for 
self-protection and food. For that community to survive and prosper, 
there are several conditions (see below) needed to exist, but religion is 
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not a necessary condition, although religion/faith/spirituality must not 
be excluded.
 These conditions are many, including a reasonable governing 
system that treats its subjects with dignity and equality. Unjust and 
harsh governance leads to the alienation of the members of that 
society from the government’s rule. Such governance also creates 
resentments, and leads to the government’s downfall in the final 
result. Just societies must treat labor (mental and physical) of each 
individual justly, for if one’s labor is abused, it leads to discouraging 
one’s contribution to the collective. And since labor is central to the 
maintenance of the collective, the collective would be under threat 
without the input of each individual member in it. To achieve and 
maintain a stable society that can survive and develop, attention must 
also be paid to education, for education is crucial to the development 
of mental and physical skills of individual members in the society. 
It is also important to guarantee public health, city planning that 
makes living possible and sustainable, for all these issues affect the 
ability of each individual to survive, develop, and contribute to the 
collective’s survival and development. As the group/collective is best 
understood as a circle, once a link in it is broken, the circle ceases 
to exist. The political, social, economic, and philosophical analyses 
offered by Ibn Khaldun, points to the need for justice, equality, and 
solidarity, so that any human can live with dignity, without which 
one cannot be human, and without which not only the individual 
collapses, but the group/collective (the sum of individuals) collapses 
as well.
 Ibn Khaldun’s work, among many others in Islamic history, as 
well as among many in other places and cultures in the world, is an 
example that exposes the fallacies of Western modernity about the 
origins of rationality and secularism. It can help us broaden these 
concepts to avoid falling into the trap of binaries of rational versus 
non-rational/secular versus non-secular, while transcending the 
myth of origins. What if the critics of secularism discussed in this 
paper take into account the argument presented by Ibn Khaldun? 
What if political Islamist groups in the region take into account the 
knowledge and heritage of thought that Islamic societies produced 
such as that of Ibn Khaldun’s? How much sense would the arguments 
of both (scholars critical of secularism and political activists on the 
ground) make after taking into consideration Ibn Khaldun’s ideas? 
Would they be relevant at all after considering these?
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CONCLUSION
In this article, I have tried to discuss some of the arguments made 
by critics of secularism and show their limitations. The arguments by 
these critics, as I have shown here, are based on false assumptions 
and binaries that obscure historical realities of societies both in the 
West as well as those in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The danger 
is that such scholarship, arguments, and theories are used to defend 
reactionary practices and groups in the Arab and Muslim worlds and 
are used as a legitimizing tools to by those who call for Islamist states 
in the region.
Regardless of whether there was ever an Islamic state, the issue 
today is whether a certain religious doctrine should be imposed on 
any state foundation or structure.  Here in our region the talk is about 
Islam, and whether Palestinians—especially as Palestinians—should 
support such an approach.
In the past, if a person or a group of people were not happy with 
a certain theological doctrine imposed by a ruler whose rule they lived 
under, they were able to change their place of residence with much 
more ease than today, living in a place where they were more dignified, 
content, or happy. Today, however, with the framework of the nation 
state—the only possible/available system to us at the moment—
people are often restricted from crossing borders and changing their 
place of residence. Palestinians are more attuned to this fact because 
Israeli settler colonial rule since 1948 has created countless refugees, 
while the rest are put under a system of repression and restriction. The 
modern Palestinian experience should be an important factor in the 
way we see/envisage a possible future state that does not duplicate the 
racist Jewish state’s ideology and/or practices.
Furthermore, regarding the question of Palestine and Western 
discourse of secularism, we also need to keep in mind how the West 
continues to support Israel despite its religious nature as a state and 
society, built on a supremacist Jewish world-view and racist practices 
against Christian and Muslim Palestinians since before its inception 
in 1948. Here again, Palestine can be a test for the rhetoric of justice, 
human rights, dignity, secularism, and tolerance. But the opposition to 
Jewish racist supremacy in Palestine must also include an opposition 
to any other supremacist ideology. One should not mirror and 
replicate Western rigidity and intolerance. We must offer something 
more humane than either Western fundamentalism or the Islamism 
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that only copies this fundamentalism. We have been, much like the 
rest of the Third World, the target of a racist, capitalist, and imperialist 
Western modernity that aims at exploiting resources and repressing 
possibilities of liberation and a dignified life. Our response should 
be to focus on common experiences, miseries, and aspirations of this 
Third World, if we hope to go beyond Western modernity. These 
commonalities can be used to form a real solidarity, or assabiyya as Ibn 
Khaldun calls it, for without group solidarity we will remain divided 
and weak and easy prey for the vicious and greedy Western dominated 
system that does not allow space for plurality.
Another important issue that I tried to highlight in this paper 
concerns critiques of secularism. It is often assumed that this discussion 
was purely a European/Western invention, ignoring the history of 
discussions of secularism in Arab/Muslim history even though the 
word itself (secularism) was not used. As Enrique Dussel (1995, 2003), 
Walter Mignolo (2012), C. K. Raju (2009), among other scholars of 
decolonial thought, argue, much of Western modernity’s claims of 
new knowledge owes much to Arab and Islamic contributions, as well 
as to the many other cultures, we should not shy away from claiming 
it. Rat her, we need to take it back and re-conceptualize knowledge 
to include non-Western philosophy and thought in order to reshape 
knowledge about ourselves, for us and for others. Knowledge must 
aim at liberation, dignity, equality, and the well-being of all members 
of our societies, not the few.
The aim of the paper was also, in part, to critique what has become 
known as political Islam in our region, i.e., a sectarian political project 
that aims at organizing/regulating our societies socially and politically 
according to some fantasy about an Islamic state from the past, to 
which we must return in order to develop, or even become a global 
dominant force.
We are speaking in the context of developing events in the 
region, amid arguments concerning the lack of contradiction between 
religion/Islam and the state at this time of human history. We are also 
speaking in light of the revolutions and changes in the region, where 
what is called political Islam has managed to hijack the revolutions 
of 2011 to 2012, after its proponents collaborated with colonial and 
dictatorial forces. 
In such arguments, both the past and the present are misrepresented, 
and hence a better future is not possible, for only if we study the past 
without silencing many aspects of it, and if we study the causes of 
22 Social Transformations Vol. 4, No. 1, Mar. 2016
current problems, can we learn that we should look for better options 
for a better future. As for the imagined past, it is correct to argue that 
there was never an Islamic state in the modern sense of the state. As 
for the present, it is defined not by a lack of religion but conditions 
that make invisible the political, economic, social, and epistemological/
intellectual reasons for the current problems in the Arab world. 
As for a better future, is it something that will never be if we 
continue to be trapped by these binaries, illusions, and evasions. The 
solutions for our current miserable situation are not to be found in 
religion or religious texts as Ibn Khaldun argued. Rather, we must 
look for solutions through a rational analysis of our social, economic, 
and political conditions. Furthermore, this future cannot be realized 
through coercion, repression, thought-policing, or by reactionary 
Islamist discourse which is both old and new, shaped by colonial and 
neocolonial structures and authoritarian rule that developed out of the 
colonial experience, and maintained through the support of Western 
neocolonialism.
Such Islamist discourse and such a program and fantasy are against 
reason and against the very being of the human. It is also against the 
concept of the political/collective as explained by Ibn Khaldun, which 
must be based on equality, justice, well-being, dignity. and prosperity 
for all. 
It is also important to stress that there is a binary in Western 
modernist thought that leaves no room for the non-material world. 
Thinking through Ibn Khaldun, among many other thinkers who did 
not fall into the binary between the material and non-material, is a 
useful step for us to take if we wish to find a way out of materialist, 
repressive, Western capitalist structure. In Ibn Khaldun’s view, humans 
are concerned with both their material, but also spiritual needs and 
desires. These cannot be satisfied only through mechanical formulas 
for “progress,” (a term he does not specifically use). Human beings 
also have spiritual and psychological needs. Yet, to run, maintain, and 
develop any society, political, social, economic, and environmental 
issues must be at the core of our analysis. Responding to such issues is 
necessary for a human society to survive. Ibn Khaldun is anything but 
a naïve humanist thinker. He, like many others, stresses moderation 
and warns against extremes that will bring the dialectic of forces, the 
negations, to the point of collapse. Justice for him is not necessarily 
an absolute category, but some measure of justice is needed for any 
human to survive and produce. 
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My drawing from Ibn Khaldun is not to suggest that there was 
some pristine past that we need to return to, but to argue against the 
fundamentalist representation of history where we are presented with 
“one true Islam” which we need to return to. 
By drawing from Ibn Khaldun, I attempted here to show that we 
had many pasts that we can draw from, and that we can and need 
to push them further to fit our current conditions. History is not 
static, and it must always develop in a way that makes more room 
for people. In the final words, one is not against religion as such, but 
against the use of religion in the modern political context of states and 
societies that cannot but exclude and cannot but produce inequality, 
not only between one religion and another, but also between good 
Muslims and bad Muslims, leading only to the exclusion of the self 
and the destruction of the collective. Islam, and other religions, can 
offer us ideas and concepts about justice, equality, and freedom. And 
so can humanist perspectives. But they must not be used as texts to be 
followed blindly. 
As Palestinians, we must, while opposing Jewish supremacy in 
Palestine, also oppose exclusionary systems elsewhere. And we must 
not replace Jewish supremacy here in Palestine with an Islamist or any 
other supremacy. Such a system, no matter who is in power, cannot 
be defended ethically or religiously. It is a system that is built on 
oppression and injustice, and cannot be sustained in the long run.
NOTES
1 A short version of this article was published in 2011 by the Institute of Women 
Studies at Birzeit University. The article was then written in light of developments 
in the region called the “Arab Spring,” the coming to power of Islamist parties in 
different countries, and the call by scholars, students, and politicians for creating 
Islamist states in the region.
2 I base the concept of the call for openness that enforces hegemonic forces on 
the discussion by Aditya Nigam (2006) concerning India, where the call for more 
space for Hinduism is explained as a call for more room for an already dominant 
identity.
3 For such views, see Ahmad (2009) and Mahmood (2005).
4 In addition to the other sources I refer to in this paper, see the different posts by 
Mahmood at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/author/smahmood/.
5 See earlier discussion of the works by Mahmood and Asad. Said’s central texts 
that seem to be neglected by these scholarly debates are Orientalism (1979) and 
Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
of the World (1977).
6 As argued in the different works of Enrique Dussel (1995, 2003), Walter Mignolo 
(2012), and others such as Jonathan Lyons (2009).
7 I call it Arabic scholarship because it was written in Arabic. It is also because some 
of these scholars were Muslims but not Islamists, and others were not Muslims.
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